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Abstract
The dominance of English language content on the Internet raises a question of
how consumer bilingualism in a given country a¤ects production of home language
content and the countrys welfare. We address this question by studying two-sided
market competition between a foreign and a domestic content distribution platform
in a small open economy. We nd, on the one hand, that bilingualism has the benet
of increasing cross-side network externalities by increasing consumer concentration on
the foreign platform, which in turn increases the amount of home language content.
On the other hand, bilingualism softens platform competition and can even lead to the
monopolization by the foreign platform. In this case, bilingualism would reduce the
amount of home language content. We consider policy implications of bilingualism
for promotion of home language content production.
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1 Introduction
During its early days, the World Wide Web was by and large a medium based on English
language. Although, with the globalization of the Internet, the presence of other languages
has steadily risen, the dominance of English does not vanish. According to a UNESCO
publication (Pimienta et al., 2009), the share of English web pages decreased from 75% in
1998 to 45% in 2007 and the share of English speaking users from 60% in 1998 to 32% in
2007 (see Figure 1). These shares are quite high relative to the share of English speakers
in the world population, which is 10.1%. Furthermore, according to the most recent data,
the dominance of English content in the Internet continues to prevail: according to Web
Technology Surveys, English is used by 53% of all the websites whose content language is
known.1 This dominance of English raises a natural question: how bilingualism of a given
country (i.e., the ability of the countrys population to speak English as well as its native
language) a¤ects the production of content in the home language and the domestic welfare?
This question is important from an economic point of view because of the steadily
growing share of international online trade (including trade in digital goods and services)
in total trade and because linguistic barriers are the main source of frictions and trade costs
in cross-border e-commerce.2 The question is also important because of its implication for
linguistic and cultural diversity.3 As a rst step to address these issues, this paper studies
how bilingualism a¤ects competition between online platforms and the production of home
language content in a small open economy.
Interactions between consumers and content providers in the Internet are mediated by
platforms such as iTunes, Google Play, and Amazon Kindle for music, ebooks, games and
movies. These also include specialized vertical search engines such as Google Shopping and
Kayak (and general search engines such as Google and Bing, to some extent), as well as
online intermediaries for e-commerce such as eBay and Amazon Marketplace.
Our analytical framework is mainly motivated by online business-to-consumer (B-to-C)
platforms which facilitate trade in digitized cultural goods such as books, songs, movies,
and games consumption of which involves knowing the language in which these goods were
1The data are available at https://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/content_language/all and were
accessed on August 21, 2018.
2Based on the consumer survey, Martens and Turlea (2012) estimate that the share of online trade in
total cross-border trade in goods between the EU member states is in the range between 6 and 12 percent.
3There is a wide concern among experts and policy-makers about e¤ects of the Internet on linguistic and
cultural diversity. For instance, according to UNESCOs experts, given the current trend, more than 50
percent of the estimated 7,000 languages spoken in the world today may disappear within a few generations
(see UNESCO, 2008, p. 16). See more on the e¤ect of the Internet on the linguistic and cultural diversity
in Crystal (2006).
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created. There are many examples of competition between U.S.-based platforms and plat-
forms originating outside of the U.S. For instance, the aforementioned Amazon competes
against Tmall.com (owned by Alibaba Group), 360Buy.com, and Suning.com in China.
In the more narrowly dened ebooks market, Amazons Kindle faces competition from
platforms such as Rakuten (Japan), Libri (Germany), Fnac (France), Cloudary (China),
Kyobo (Korea). In streaming video on demand (SVOD), Netix competes in France against
French pay TV groups Canal Plus and Orange Cinema Series4 and against several local
players in China.5 In streaming audio, the U.S.-based platforms Spotify and iTunes as well
as Frances platform Deezer compete against the major domestic online music distributor
MelOn in the Korean market.
In this paper, we build on a well-known model of two-sided markets (Armstrong, 2006)
to analyze platform competition in a small open economy (i.e., the home country) where the
competing home and foreign platforms bring together content producers (CPs, hereafter)
and consumers. While the home language is used only by domestic CPs and consumers in
the home country, foreign CPs use the foreign language. If consumers of the home country
are bilingual, they can consume foreign as well as domestic content. Our baseline model
captures the business models of B-to-C online platforms which charge CPs for access to the
platforms while providing free access to consumers. But in order to check the robustness
of our analytical framework, we also consider a stylized model akin to SVOD platforms
which acquire content from CPs and then sell access to this content (without advertising)
to consumers (see the online Appendix).
Using this framework, we study how platform competition and the amount of content in
the home language are a¤ected by whether consumers of the home country are monolingual
or bilingual.6 In particular, we address the following questions. Does bilingualism increase
4Recently, the entry of Netix in European countries has generated concerns regarding creation of Eu-
ropean content. For instance, the French lm producersassociation complained that "Neix is engaging in
"scal dumping" by establishing its European base in Amsterdam and thus avoiding the French audiovisual
taxes that national television channels and rival streaming services pay to subsidize French lms." (The
New York Times, "Europeans Bracing for Netix", by Doreen Carvajal, September 12, 2014).
5The major SVOD players in China are iQIYI (an independent subsidiary of Baidu) and Tmall Box
O¢ ce (or TBO) o¤ered by the e-commerce giant Alibaba. There are also several smaller players such as
LeTV, Sohu, and Yoku Tudou. See, http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2016/01/13/netix-
is-now-global-but-is-chinas-market-key-for-its-international-success
6The focus on the extreme cases of completely monolingual and completely bilingual consumers allows
us to keep the model tractable and generate the main insights on the issue. In the future research, it
would be interesting to study whether the equilibria in the intermediate cases, in which some fraction of
consumers are monolingual and the rest are bilingual, would have (or not have) a monotonebehaviour
as the share of bilingual consumers varies.
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the foreign platforms market share in the home country? Does bilingualism make platform
competition ercer? How does bilingualism a¤ect online availability and production of home
language content and the domestic welfare?7 Although we mainly have in mind trade in
cultural goods such as books, songs, and movies, consumption of which involves knowing the
language in which these goods were created, our framework can be applied more generally
to trade in all goods and services (physical or digital) involving information or labeling
encoded in a certain language, which can be a barrier for cross-border transactions.
We assume that the two platforms o¤er a service of the same quality. The main di¤er-
ence between them is that the home platform o¤ers the domestic consumers access only to
home countrys domestic content while the foreign one gives them access to both domestic
and foreign content.8 Since platforms are assumed to o¤er no content translation and only
bilingual domestic consumers can use foreign content, this di¤erence between the platforms
does not matter when consumers of the home country are monolingual. However, the dif-
ference creates an advantage for the foreign platform when consumers are bilingual. At
the same time, the foreign platform has a certain disadvantage since we assume that from
the perspective of the bilingual consumers some o¤erings of the home country CPs may
serve as direct substitutes for the o¤erings of the foreign country CPs. In other words,
when consumers are bilingual, our assumptions imply: if the platforms have the same mass
of consumers, a domestic CP prefers joining the domestic platform to joining the foreign
platform; if both platforms have the same mass of domestic CPs, a consumer prefers the
foreign platform to the domestic platform. The platforms do not charge any price to con-
sumers9 but charge subscription prices (and transaction fees in the framework considered in
the on-line Appendix)) to CPs. In addition, we assume that consumers single-home while
CPs multi-home.10
Our rst result is that bilingualism increases the foreign platforms consumer market
7We distinguish the amount of content available in the platforms given the total amount of content
produced from the content production itself.
8We make an extreme assumption that the domestic home-country platform (unlike foreign platform) is
monolingual and can o¤er access only to content in the home-country language. In reality, of course, both
home and foreign platforms are bilingual, but all we need for our results to go through is to assume that the
foreign (home) platform has a comparative advantage in providing access to foreign (home) content. One
way to capture this comparative advantage is illustrated below in this paper (see footnote 23 in subsection
2.2).
9In the online Appendix, we provide an exention in which we allow platforms to charge fees to both sides
and provide a condition under which each platform nds it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer
side when the non-negativity constraint on consumer access fee exists.
10We show that in equilibrium, no consumer has an incentive to multi-home (see Proposition 8 in Ap-
pendix).
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share in the home country. Although this result is expected, it is not trivial as there are
two opposing e¤ects at work. Having foreign content on board helps the foreign platform
to attract bilingual consumers. However, since domestic CPs prefer to avoid competition
from foreign CPs, the foreign platform has di¢ culty in attracting domestic CPs, which,
in turn, makes it harder to attract consumers. We show that the rst e¤ect dominates:
bilingualism can even lead to a tipping equilibrium in which all domestic consumers access
content through the foreign platform.
Our second result is that bilingualism softens platform competition, which implies that
it allows each platform to extract more surplus from CPs. This result is based on the mul-
tiplier e¤ect in our model of two-sided market. Suppose that some consumers switch from
platform 2 to platform 1. This increases the number of CPs subscribed to platform 1 while
decreasing the number of CPs subscribed to platform 2, which, in turn, induces additional
consumers to switch from platform 2 to platform 1, and so on. Interestingly, this multiplier
e¤ect increases with each platforms e¢ ciency in matching CPs with consumers. Therefore,
when a platform becomes more e¢ cient, the CPsdemands for platformsmatching ser-
vices becomes more elastic and consequently platform competition becomes stronger. By
contrast, platform competition becomes weaker when the platform becomes less e¢ cient.
When consumers are bilingual, substitution between domestic content and foreign con-
tent reduces the value of exchanges between domestic CPs and consumers through the
foreign platform. More precisely, the ability to consume foreign content reduces the mar-
ginal surplus that consumers using the foreign platform obtain from additional domestic
CPs, as well as the marginal surplus that domestic CPs subscribed to the foreign platform
obtain from additional consumers. It is as if bilingualism makes the foreign platform a less
e¢ cient matchmaker, which softens platform competition for the reasons explained earlier.
When we make the amount of home language content endogenous, we nd, as our third
result, that there is a positive feedback e¤ect between production of home language content
and platform competition, which was not previously identied in the economics literature.
The more home language content is produced, the higher is the multiplier, which intensies
platform competition. This implies that the platforms charge lower fees to CPs, which
further increases the amount of content produced and so on. However, when bilingualism
leads to the tipping equilibrium in which the foreign platform charges the monopoly price
to domestic CPs, it eliminates this positive feedback.
Combining the above three results generates nuanced predictions regarding the impact
of bilingualism on the amount of home language content (in terms of its online availability
and production). Conventional wisdom would suggest that substitution between foreign
language content and home language content would negatively a¤ect the latter. This would
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be true in a one-sidedmarket. However, in a two-sided market, bilingual consumersability
to consume foreign language content can increase the amount of home language content as it
increases consumer concentration in the foreign platform and thereby strengthens the cross-
side network externalities. On the negative side, bilingualism softens platform competition
and can even lead to the monopolization by the foreign platform, which removes the positive
feedback between content production and platform competition. In this case, bilingualism
is likely to reduce the amount of home language content.
We show that in general, the welfare e¤ect of bilingualism depends on the weight of
producer surplus relative to consumer surplus. The di¤erence between consumer surplus
and producer surplus can arise because consumers directly benet from foreign content
while domestic CPs directly su¤er from it because of substitution between domestic and
foreign content. For most European and Latin American countries, both the relevant
English language content and the degree of its substitutability with the home language
content of these countries are expected to be relatively large. Therefore, in those countries
unlike countries in Asia, bilingualism typically would increase consumer surplus at the cost
of reducing producer surplus, which then decreases domestic welfare if the relative weight
of producer surplus is large.
Our results also suggest that supporting a viable domestic platform and facilitating
robust platform competition should be an integral part of the policy aimed at home language
content promotion. This is because of the synergy between home language CPs and the
domestic platform that arises from the positive feedback e¤ect between home language
content production and platform competition. Such a synergy suggests that it may be to
the advantage of the home country to facilitate the distribution of the foreign content on the
domestic platform. Such measures would reduce the likelihood of market monopolization
by the foreign platform by giving the domestic platform a more level-playing eld against
the foreign platform as foreign CPs do not need to incur any xed cost to make their content
available for the distribution by the foreign platform among home country consumers as
their content is already available on the platform for foreign consumers.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.1, we review the related literature.
In Section 2, we present our baseline model of platform competition with international
trade. In Section 3 (4), we consider the monolingual (bilingual) case. In Section 5, we
compare the two cases in terms of consumer market shares, the amount of home language
content available on the Internet and the welfare of the home country. Section 6 studies the
impact of bilingualism on the production of home language content. Section 7 concludes.
The online Appendix provides three extensions to show the robustness of our results to
alternative platform business models.
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1.1 Literature review
Our paper builds on the literature on two-sided markets (Caillaud and Jullien, 2001, 2003,
Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006, Anderson and Coate, 2005, Armstrong 2006, Hagiu 2006,
Weyl, 2010).11 Two-sided markets can be roughly dened as industries where platforms
provide intermediation services between two (or several) kinds of users. Typical examples
include dating agencies, payment cards (Rochet and Tirole, 2002), mass media (Anderson
and Coate, 2005), operating systems (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005), video games (Hagiu
2006), academic journals (Jeon and Rochet, 2010) etc. In such industries, it is vital for
platforms to nd a price structure that attracts su¢ cient numbers of users on each side
of the market. Our paper has two novel aspects. First, it is the rst paper that studies
competition among platforms serving as intermediaries in international trade. Second, we
examine how platform competition is a¤ected by trade barriers that arise due to linguistic
di¤erences between buyers and sellers.12
In our model, the language-related trade surplus is formalized in a way that is similar
to Lazear (1999) where individuals are randomly matched and a match generates a surplus
only if the matched individuals share common language. This generates positive network
externalities among individuals using a common language, which is a standard feature of
several recent models of bilingualism.13 However, our framework di¤ers from the previous
models of language or bilingualism in the following two dimensions. First, in our model,
matches occur between two sides of a market: consumers and CPs. A surplus is created
only if a matched pair of a consumer and a CP share common language. Second, matches
are mediated by competing platforms.
This paper is also related to the international economics literature that emphasizes the
role played by information networks in facilitating international trade. While the signi-
cance of traditional barriers to trade has been declining over time, barriers and frictions
related to incomplete or asymmetric information with regard to trading opportunities in
foreign markets remain substantial (Portes and Rey, 2005). Among the sources of these
11Our model in which we assume single-homing for consumers and multi-homing for CPs is similar to
Anderson and Coate (2005), Armstrong and Wright (2007) and Hagiu (2009).
12Two empirical industrial organization papers (Gandal, 2006, and Viard and Economides, 2015) are
related to our paper since they view the Internet as a two-sided market and study the impact of the on-
line userslanguage heterogeneity on their demand for accessing foreign (mainly English language) digital
content.
13For example, Church and King (1993) study each individuals choice to become bilingual and Ortega
and Tangeras (2008) analyze the politically dominant groups choice between unilingual and bilingual
education. An excellent overview of the literature on bilingualism and a novel economics analylsis of
languages is provided in Ginsburgh and Weber (2011).
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information-related costs of cross-border transactions are linguistic and cultural di¤erences
between the transacting parties. One of the traditional means of overcoming these sort
of trade costs has been information networks of internationally dispersed ethnic diasporas,
sharing the same language and databases of business contacts, which can be viewed as
precursors of modern e-commerce platforms.14 The importance of common language has
also been emphasized in the literature which uses the gravity model of international trade
to show that immigrants promote trade with their country of origin (see Gould, 1994, Head
and Ries, 1998 and Wagner et al. 2002).15
Several authors have analyzed cross-border e-commerce using di¤erent versions of the
gravity model which typically includes an explanatory variable capturing trade costs caused
by language barriers (e.g., Blum and Glodfarb, 2006, Hortaçsu et al., 2009, Hanson and
Xiang, 2011, Lendl et al., 2012, Martens and Turlea, 2012, and Ferreira and Waldfogel,
2013). Most of these papers conrm that as the importance of geographical distance-
related trade costs decreases, other types of transaction costs become more prominent in
online trade, in particular costs related to language barriers.16
While there is a substantial empirical literature studying online international trade, we
are aware of only a few recent papers that construct relevant formal models for analyzing
this phenomenon and the related trade and regulatory policies. And all these relevant
theoretical studies are concerned not with online trade in digital content as such, but rather
14Rauch (1999) shows that trade networks based on family ties, colonial ties or a common language are
important in explaining trade patterns, especially for di¤erentiated goods that do not have reference prices.
15A somewhat broader literature emphasizes the importance of ethnic and linguistic commonalities be-
tween countries for facilitating their international trade. For example, Melitz (2008) argues that linguistic
diversity of the countrys population (e.g., bilingualism) promotes its foreign trade and considers the issue
of the possible network externalities due to a common language. Melitz and Toubal (2014) constructed a
common language index which summarizes evidence about inuences of common o¢ cial language, common
native language, common spoken language and linguistic proximity and nd that it has a strongly positive
impact on trade in goods. See Egger and Lassmann (2012) for a meta-analysis of the common language
e¤ect on trade.
16Among the more prominent papers in this vein one can cite Blum and Goldfarb (2006) who nd that
distance negatively a¤ects trade even in purely digital products and services that are free of transportation
costs as long as their consumption is sensitive to cultural variables such as language (e.g., online music,
games, and videos). Ferreira and Waldfogel (2013) study cross-border consumption of music using a data
on popular music charts and conclude that despite recent advances in information and communication
technologies, the e¤ects of distance and language have remained fairly constant. Hanson and Xiang (2011)
analyze data on US lm exports using an econometric specication with some gravity explanatory variables.
They nd that average revenues per US lm are negatively correlated with geographic distance and linguistic
distance in a manner consistent with adjustment to these trade costs occurring along the intensive rather
than the extensive margin.
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with the cross-border distribution of cultural goods, including audio and visual artwork and
programming by means of radio and TV broadcasting. For example, Richardson (2006)
and Richardson and Wilkie (2015) analyze the e¤ects of cultural and local music quotas in
the context of commercial radio broadcasting of playlists, which mix domestic and foreign
content. However, these papers employ models which are very di¤erent from ours and do
not rely on two-sided markets interpretation of online intermediaries.17
2 Model
We build on a well-known analysis of two-sided markets (Armstrong, 2006) to analyze
platform competition in a small open economy (the home country) and introduce common
language as a necessary condition for an interaction between two sides (i.e., consumers and
CPs). There are two languages: home language and foreign language. The home language is
only spoken by consumers of the home country while the foreign language is used abroad and
by bilingual consumers of the home country. We assume that all CPs in the home country
have their content in the home language, and refer to them as domestic CPs. We view
a platform as an intermediary between consumers and CPs and focus on the competition
between two platforms, indexed by i = 1 or 2, within the home country. Platform 1 is
assumed to be foreign and bilingual while platform 2 is domestic and monolingual. By
monolingual we mean that it provides services to consumers and CPs only in the home
language.18 We then compare the situation where consumers of the home country are
bilingual to the one in which they are monolingual.
17More generally, trade in cultural goods was analyzed in Francois and van Ypersele (2002) which de-
veloped the view that such goods are a source of externality due to increasing returns in their production.
By contrast, in our model, an externality arises instead due to the indirect network e¤ect at the intermedi-
ation level involving foreign language. More recent papers by Janeba (2007), Rauch and Trindade (2009),
and Olivier et al. (2008) have considered models with consumers experiencing culture related externalities
which may justify import restrictions (or subsidies) in cultural goods industries. Maystre et al. (2014)
considered a model with monopolistic competition where trade liberalization simultaneously generates an
increase in trade volume and a decrease in bilateral cultural distances which suggests that long-run and
short-run welfare e¤ects of trade policies in cultural goods industries may be quite di¤erent. Bala and
Long (2005) construct a dynamic model which provides an explanation of why small countries sometimes
insist on excluding cultural goods from trade agreements. While policy issues considered in these papers
are related to our paper, they employ analytical frameworks which are very di¤erent from ours. Among the
prominent empirical studies of trade in cultural goods, one can cite Disdier et al. (2010 a, b), Hellmanzik
and Schmitz (2015), and Aguiar and Waldfogel (2018).
18Our analysis can also be extended to the case in which both platforms are bilingual but di¤er in their
coverage of foreign language content. See footnote 23.
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2.1 Platforms, CPs and consumers
The general structure of the model is the following. In the home country, there are a mass
one of consumers and a mass m (> 0) of CPs whose content is already produced and can
be made available on a platform. In Section 6, we make endogenous the amount of home
language content produced.19 For any given pair of a consumer and a domestic CP that
interacts in platform i, we assume that the interaction generates a surplus of ai > 0 to
the consumer and a surplus of bi > 0 to the CP. For tractability of the model, we assume
that bi does not depend on the supply of home language content on platform i. However,
some foreign content may be substituted for home content so that the values ai and bi may
depend on the foreign content available on the platform. In Appendix, we analyze a formal
search model showing how to derive the values ai and bi:
We view ai as the expected consumer surplus generated by an additional domestic CP
in platform i, which is the product of the (additional) probability that the CPs content
is matched to a consumer and the expected surplus conditional on the match. Similarly,
bi is the expected prot of a CP per consumer on platform i, which is the product of
the probability of the match between a consumer and the CP and the expected prot
conditional on the match. In the next subsection, we explain how bilingualism and foreign
content a¤ect ai and bi.
We consider horizontally-di¤erentiated platforms and assume that consumers are uni-
formly distributed on the Hotelling interval between zero and one. Platform 1 (2) is located
at zero (one). A consumer derives utility from a platforms basic service and from access
to the CPs subscribed to the platform, net of the transportation cost. We assume that the
value of basic services u1 and u2 are large enough such that every consumer ends up using
one of the two platforms. Consumers single-home, i.e. subscribe to only one platform. We
show in Appendix that there is no equilibrium in which consumers choose to multihome.
In terms of pricing, we assume that platforms do not charge any price to consumers
while each platform i = 1; 2 charges a subscription fee Fi to CPs. For instance, in the
case of Amazon, the platform charges professional sellers $ 39.99 for monthly subscription
19By ignoring the domestic market in the foreign country we focus on one of the two national markets.
Our article is a rst step to the next one in which we can study the fully reciprocal model of international
trade in content mediated by two platforms competing in the two national markets. Empirically such a
reciprocal digital trade environment was already investigated in Aguiar and Waldfogel (2018) who analyzed
and compared theatrical versus Netix distribution of lms into 56 countries. They nd that Netix as a
global distribution platform facilitates trade both from the USA to the rest of the world, as well as from
smaller countries, such as Norway, to the USA. And while the US-origin repertoire has the highest reach
measure through both Netix and theatrical distribution channels, the US dominance over other repertoires
is smaller in Netix distribution.
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in addition to charges per item sold (such as referral and closing fees).20 In the online
Appendix, we consider various alternative business models and show the robustness of our
results to di¤erent assumptions about platformspricing structures.
Thus, if ni domestic CPs join platform i; the utility of a consumer located at x 2 [0; 1]
is u1 + a1n1   tx if she joins platform 1, and u2 + a2n2   t (1  x) if she joins platform 2;





u1   u2 + a1n1   a2n2
2t
: (1)
CPs multi-home as long as this gives them a higher benet than single-homing. In
order to make its content available on a platform, a CP should incur a xed cost that is
uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1=f ] ; where we normalize f = 1 for expositional
simplicity.21 We assume that the highest cost/benet ratio is large enough that there are
always CPs who decide not to join any platform, which holds if b is not too large.22
Given the fees and the consumer market shares, the masses of content producers joining
platform 1 and 2 are respectively given by
n1 = m (b1x1   F1) and n2 = m (b2 (1  x1)  F2) : (2)
The platform i then chooses subscription fee Fi to maximize prot
i = Fini (3)
given the system of demands (1) and (2). Bilingualism and foreign content a¤ect the out-
come of competition by changing the values of ui; ai and bi:
2.2 Language and exchanges
In the monolingual case, consumers can access only home language CPs. We assume that
the translation service is imperfect; hence the foreign platform does not provide translation
services that would expand the supply to foreign content. We assume that the platforms
20See http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=200306550
21The cost of making content available in a platform is non-negligible and distinct from the cost of
producing content (which can also be distributed through o­ ine channels such as TV, radio, print and
removable storage media.) For instance, Bresnahan et als. (2015) explain tipping out of small platforms
for mobile apps in the US by decisions of owners of attractive applications not to make them available
in small platforms even if they are available in the major platforms. The distinction between the cost of
producing content and cost of making it available in a distribution platform is important in the model of
home language content production which we will introduce in Section 6.
22A su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition is b  1:
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are equally e¢ cient and therefore that the value of basic service as well as the values of
interactions are the same for both platforms: u1 = u2 = u, a1 = a2 = a and b1 = b2 = b:
Consider now the bilingual case. Given that platform 2 o¤ers its service only in home
language, the utility parameters are unchanged for this platform: (u2; a2; b2) = (u; a; b) :
As for platform 1; let nF > 0 be the measure of the foreign language content that is
available on the platform and is relevant to consumers of the home country. By "relevant"
we mean that consumers of the home country have demand for that content and are able
to obtain it at a negligible transaction cost if they are willing to. For instance, if content is
not free and cross-border online transactions are subject to heavy tari¤s and/or non-tari¤
trade barriers, nF is small even if the measure of foreign language CPs accessible through
platform 1 is large. Similarly, if the home countrys economic and cultural background
di¤ers substantially from that of the foreign country, nF is small.23 We consider nF as
an exogenous parameter, which is justied by our assumption that the home country is
su¢ ciently small that it cannot inuence the presence of foreign language content on the
foreign platform.24 In the end of Section 4, we examine the possibility that the platform
may restrict access to foreign content and nd that it has no incentive to impose such
restriction.
We assume substitution between foreign language content and domestic content for
bilingual consumers. More precisely, given n1 amount of home language content and
nFamount of foreign language content, the total amount of content consumed by each
bilingual consumer is n1+nF  2Fn1 where F > 0 is a parameter of substitution.25 As an
increase in nF should increase the extent of content substitution, nF and F are related with
each other but we treat them as distinct parameters in order to highlight their respective
role in shaping the strategy of the foreign platform. In what follows, we introduce an





> 2Fn1. We further assume that when
some mutually substitutable content is o¤ered both in the home and the foreign language,
a bilingual consumer interacts with either content with the same probability. Therefore,
among the total of n1+nF  2Fn1 interactions mediated by platform 1 there are n1 Fn1
in the home language and nF   Fn1 in foreign language.26
23If platform 2 provides some access to foreign language content, we can dene nFi as each platforms
mass of "relevant" foreign language CPs and consider nF = nF1   nF2 > 0.
24Viard and Economides (2013) make a similar assumption that content creation by "large" countries is
exogenous to adoption in "small" countries and nd empirical support for it.
25Introducing substitution among the o¤erings of domestic CPs does not qualitatively a¤ect our results.
See the footnote right after Proposition 2.
26This tie-breaking assumption is for simplicity only and our results hold no matter the tie-breaking
assumption as long as F > 0. See the footnote right after Proposition 2.
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Given the values a and b per interaction, a bilingual consumers utility on platform 1
is u + a(n1 + nF   2Fn1) and a domestic CPs surplus is b(1   F )x1; which translate
into new values of u1; a1 and b1 for the foreign platform. The next table summarizes our
assumptions on the benets of interactions between consumers and CPs.27
Table 1: surplus parameters (ui; ai; bi) in each platform
Platform 1 Platform 2
monolingual consumers (u; a; b) (u; a; b)
bilingual consumers
 
u+ anF ; a
 
1  2F  ; b(1  F ) (u; a; b)
Hence bilingualism increases the stand-alone utility by anF and reduces the indirect
network e¤ect by a factor 2F for consumers and F for domestic CPs. Since neither the
total o¤erings of the domestic CPs nor the total o¤erings of the foreign CPs can be smaller
than the mutually substitutable o¤erings, we make the following assumption:
Assumption A1: 1=2 > F ; nF > 2F (1  F )bm:
The rst part of A1 is simply equivalent to n1 > 2
Fn1, which must hold obviously.
The second part of A1 ensures that nF > 2Fn1; relying on the fact that an upper bound
of the measure of the domestic CPs that subscribe to platform 1 is b
 
1  F m from the
supply equation (2). This condition implies in particular that it is not possible to have too
high degree of substitution with foreign content.
The timing of the game we consider is the following:
 Stage 1: Each platform i for i = 1; 2 simultaneously chooses the subscription fee Fi
for domestic CPs.
 Stage 2: After observing (F1; F2), domestic CPs make decisions to subscribe to plat-
form 1 and/or platform 2.
 Stage 3: After observing (n1; n2), each consumer decides which platform to use.
Notice that consumers observe the volume of content on each platform when deciding
which to join. The CPs however need to form expectation of each platforms consumer
market share to decide whether to pay a fee or not.
27We should point out here that this representation is valid also if bilingual consumers obtain a utility
uB 6= u at platform 1 (due to bilingual service) provided that we redene nF as ~nF = uB ua + nF :
12
3 Monolingual consumers
Consider the case in which all consumers are monolingual. As a consequence, there is no
international trade except for the "cross-border" provision of the intermediation service by
the foreign platform for the domestic consumers and CPs in the home country. We use
superscript M to indicate the monolingual case.
Given symmetric parameters (u; a; b) ; the gross utility di¤erential between platform 1
and platform 2 is a (n1   n2). At stage 2, one point increase in a platforms anticipated
consumer market share raises its CP demand by mb. We assume the following stability
condition, which is standard in the two-sided market literature:
Assumption A2: t > abm.
The reason for the assumption is the following. Suppose that an exogenous shock in-
creases the mass of consumers on platform 1 by " unit (without a¤ecting x2). Then, from
(2), the mass of subscribed CPs increases by bm" units on platform 1. This induces (from
(1)) a mass of abm"=2t extra consumers to switch from platform 2 to platform 1. This in
turn increases n1 by ab2 (m)
2 "=2t and reduces n2 by ab2 (m)
2 "=2t, which induces (from
(1)) an additional increase in platform 1s consumer share by (abm)2 "=2t2 etc. If A2 is
not satised, the mass of these extra consumers who switch later is larger than the mass of
consumers who originally switched, which makes the system explode. When it holds, the
total increase in x1 is equal to [1 + M ]" where
M  abm
2t  2abm (4)
is the positive multiplier in our two-sided market for the monolingual case. Then, given








and ni = m (xib  Fi) : Furthermore, we can also consider M a measure of platform com-
petition in the monolingual case. In fact, platform is prot, i = Fini, is maximized at






for i = 1; 2: (6)
Therefore, all other things being equal, as M increases, there is more competition between
the two platforms. (6) shows that in any shared equilibrium in which each platform has a
positive consumer market share, the platforms share in the CPssurplus is constant and
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the same for both platforms. In particular, as the measure of the platform competition
M increases, the platforms share decreases: the stronger competition between the two
platforms, the smaller is the share of the surplus captured by the platforms. This measure
of the degree of platform competition increases with each element in (a; b;m) and decreases
in t, which is very intuitive as an increase in any of (a; b;m) increases the elasticity of the
CPs demand for the platforms service.
We have:
Proposition 1 (monolingual case): Consider the case in which all consumers are mono-
lingual. Under Assumption A2, we have a unique equilibrium, which involves two symmetric
active platforms.






for i = 1; 2:
(b) The equilibrium outcome is described by:
xMi = x












for i = 1; 2:
Proof. See Appendix.
In reality, some foreign content can be translated into the home language. In the case
of books, for instance, translated content is produced by domestic CPs who pay copyright
fees and royalties to the foreign CPs owning the original content. Therefore, translated
content becomes part of home language content. One way to include such a translation
in our model is by assuming that the mass of home language content which is already
produced and can be made available on a platform is increased from m to m0(> m), where
the di¤erencem0 m increases with nF and decreases with the cost of translation. This will
lead to the symmetric equilibrium described in Proposition 1 in which m is replaced by m0.
In fact, the symmetric equilibrium with m0 captures the best case scenario in terms of the
domestic welfare since translated content may have lower quality than original content and
may be a substitute for some of home language content. As our monolingual case (i.e., the
symmetric equilibrium with m) captures the worst case scenario with the innite cost of
translation, if bilingualism leads to a reduction in home language content or the domestic




In this section, we study the case in which all consumers are bilingual. We use superscript
B to indicate the bilingual case.
We rst dene a very important parameter   which measures the reduction in the
e¢ ciency of the exchanges in the home language within platform 1 due to the access to
foreign language content:
Denition 1    1  (1  F )(1  2F ).
In the absence of the exchanges in the foreign language, the e¢ ciency of exchanges in
the home language within each platform can be measured by ab. From Table 1, exchanges
in the foreign language reduce the surplus that a domestic CP obtains from having an
additional consumer from b to b(1   F ) and the surplus that a consumer obtains from
having an additional domestic CP from a to a(1  2F ). Therefore, the e¢ ciency measure
of exchanges in the home language within platform 1 becomes ab (1   ) and is reduced by
ab .
Since   = F
 
3  2F , under Assumption A1 that F 2 [0; 1=2), we have   2 [0; 1)
and   strictly increases with F . As there is one-to-one relationship between F and  ; we
use   when it is more convenient.
Shared equilibrium
We rst study an equilibrium in which both platforms are active. At Stage 3, the gross
utility di¤erential between platform 1 and platform 2 is now a
 
n1 + n
F   2Fn1   n2

while
one point increase in anticipated market shares raises the CP demand by mb(1   F ) on
platform 1 and by mb on platform 2. Following the same reasoning as in the monolingual
case, the multiplier for the domestic platform 2 in the bilingual case is
B  abm




while for the foreign platform the multiplier is B(1    ). For expositional simplicity, in
what follows, we simply call B the multiplier in the bilingual case. Then, from (1), (2)















From (2) and (8), by maximizing i = Fini, we obtain the equilibrium price conditions.













The domestic platforms share in the surplus generated by domestic CPs takes the same
form as in the monolingual case, but for the relevant multiplier B: For   > 0, the share
of a CPs surplus retained by the foreign platform is higher than what is retained by the
domestic platform. The reason is that the perceived price elasticity is lower for the foreign
platform, due to lower intensity of indirect network e¤ects.
Moreover, we have:
Proposition 2 (competition softening e¤ect): Suppose that Assumptions A1 and A2 hold.
Then, bilingualism softens platform competition:
B < M for   > 0 and B = M for   = 0:
As a consequence, both platforms retain a higher share of the CPs surplus than in
the monolingual case. As we previously explained, exchanges in the foreign language come
with the cost of making exchanges in the home language less valuable in platform 1. More
precisely, the e¢ ciency measure of exchanges in the home language within platform 1 is
reduced by ab . This change in platform 1s e¢ ciency has spillover to the other platform
since the multiplier in our two-sided market depends on the sum of the e¢ ciency measures
of each platform. In particular, bilingualism softens platform competition by reducing the
multiplier compared with the monolingual case.28
Substituting the prices in (8) with the expressions from (9) gives the equilibrium market




















xB1 > 0 under A1 and A2 because 1 > 
B  holds in (10). Notice that xB1 linearly increases
with nF .
The existence of the shared equilibrium requires xB1  1 so that platform 2 is active,
which leads to the following condition:
28For this reason, Proposition 2 holds no matter the tie-breaking rule applied to mutually substitutable
content. This is because bilingualism always strictly reduces a1 and weakly reduces b1. For a similar
reason, if we assume, in addition to the substitution between foreign content and domestic content, the
substitution among the o¤erings of purely domestic CPs, our main results will not be a¤ected. Although
adding such an assumption softens the multiplier e¤ect both in the monolingual and the bilingual cases,
the result that the presence of the substitution between the domestic and foreign content o¤erings makes
the multiplier in the bilingual case smaller than the one in the monolingual case remain intact. We assume











2 + B(1   )

 nF : (11)
Tipping equilibrium
We have seen above that there is no equilibrium in which platform 2 corners the market.
However, there can be an equilibrium in which platform 2 is not active. When x1 = 1,
the mass of CPs on platform 1 is m
 
(1  F )b  F1

so that platform 1s prot, 1 =










where the superscript T means tipping. This is an equilibrium if platform 2 cannot attract
any consumers and therefore any CPs by charging F2 = 0: Hence, we have a cornering
equilibrium with a monopoly price, if at prices
 
F T1 ; F2 = 0

, platform 2 does not sell,









 nF : (13)
One can verify that 0 < nF < nF holds for   2 [0; 1). As should be expected, for nF between
nF and nF ; the market is tipping but the presence of platform 2 constrains the pricing of
the foreign platform.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 3 (bilingual case): Suppose that Assumptions A1 and A2 hold. When all
consumers are bilingual, we have a unique equilibrium.
(i) If the condition nF  nF holds, the equilibrium is a shared equilibrium. Then, we
have:
FB1 =
xB1 (1  F )b










1 (1  F )

1 + B(1   )
2 + B(1   )








where the foreign platforms market share xB1 is given by (10).
(ii) If the condition nF > nF holds, the equilibrium is such that platform 1 corners the




(iii) For nF < nF < nF , the equilibrium is such that platform 1 corners the market and
charges a price below the monopoly price.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 1 (endogenous nF ): We can make nF and F endogenous as follows. Suppose
that some exogenous measure NF of foreign content is already on board in the foreign plat-
form for the distribution in the foreign countrys market. Hence, there is no need to incur a
xed cost to make the foreign content available on the foreign platform for the distribution
in the home countrys market.29 Consider now that platform 1 chooses the available content
volume nF  NF as well as the parameter of substitution F : Clearly there is a link between
the two, so the platform choice set is restricted. For any equilibrium,30 the prot increases
with nF so that the foreign platform benets from increasing foreign content volume as long
as it does not raise the extent of substitution with domestic content. It may refrain from
raising nF if this implies greater content substitution. However, rather surprisingly, we can
show that the foreign platform benets from having some small substitution F when t is
small and nF is not too large. In this case, since there is strong competition between the plat-
forms, platform 1 would benet from relaxing competition by creating content substitution
and thereby reducing the two-sided multiplier.
5 Comparison of the monolingual and the bilingual
cases
In this section, we compare the monolingual case and the bilingual one in terms of the
amount of home language content available on the platforms and the home country welfare.
5.1 Home language content available on the platforms
The amount of domestic content available on each platform depends on the consumer
market shares, the amount crowded out by foreign content and the intensity of competition.
Let us rst examine the consumer market shares.
From the market share in (10), the foreign platforms market share is higher in the
bilingual case than in the monolingual case (i.e., xB1 > 1=2) if the volume of foreign content
is large enough given the degree of substitution F . We show below that this is always the
case.
29Interestingly, this point is also emphasized in Hanson and Xiang (2011) who conclude that for motion
picture trade global xed export costs dominate bilateral (i.e., destination market-specic) xed export
costs. However, their data is on motion-picture distribution through theathrical releases rather than on-line.
30Here we consider a timing in which xed payments from the foreign CPs to platform 1 were made
before platform 1 chooses the fee for domestic CPs.
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Proposition 4 (market share): Suppose Assumptions A1 and A2 hold. Then bilingualism
increases the consumer market share of the foreign platform.
Proof. See Appendix.
Bilingualism has three e¤ects in our model. First the foreign platform becomes more
attractive to consumers who value the foreign content. Second, for given consumer market
share, the foreign platform becomes less attractive to domestic CPs due to competition
with substitute foreign content. Third, lower indirect network e¤ects reduce the intensity
of competition and raises more the prices on the foreign platform than on the domestic
platform. The proposition shows that the rst e¤ect dominates the last two. However, the
last two e¤ects mitigate the increase of the foreign platforms market share.
We can now examine how bilingualism a¤ects the amount of domestic content available
in the Internet.
Consider rst the shared equilibrium. We know from Proposition 2 that bilingualism
softens competition, which reduces the volume of domestic content for given consumer mar-
ket shares. This together with the fact that bilingualism reduces the domestic platforms
market share implies that bilingualism reduces the amount of domestic content on this plat-
form. Bilingualism increases the market share of the foreign platform, which will attract
more domestic CPs unless the larger market share is o¤set by the price increase and the
substitution with foreign content. Thus in the shared equilibrium, we expect bilingualism
to reduce the volume of domestic content on the foreign platform when its consumer market
share is not very large or when the degree of substitution between domestic and foreign
content is high.
Consider now the monopoly tipping equilibrium. On the one hand, domestic CPs
capture a smaller share of surplus in the bilingual case than in the monolingual case because
of the monopoly power of the platform. On the other hand, the mass of consumers is twice
larger in the foreign platform under the bilingual case than the mass in each platform under
the monolingual case. This can increase the measure of CPs subscribed to the bilingual
platform because of economies of scale in the interactions between consumers and CPs (i.e.,
due to the cross-side network externality in this two-sided market). We nd again that the
measure of CPs in the tipping equilibrium nT1 = bm
 
1  F  =2 is smaller than nM if and
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Since the right hand side of (14) increases with t, when there is little di¤erentiation of
service o¤ered by the platforms and a high degree of substitution between the foreign
language and the home language content, the price increase by the foreign platform more
than o¤sets the increase in its consumer market share. As a result, bilingualism reduces
the amount of content in the home language. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 5 (content available in the Internet): Suppose Assumptions A1 and A2 hold.
(i) In the shared equilibrium, bilingualism reduces the amount of content available on
the domestic platform. Bilingualism raises the amount of domestic content available on the
foreign platform if F is small and reduces it if F is large.
(ii) In the monopoly tipping equilibrium, bilingualism reduces the amount of domestic
content available (i.e. nT1 < n
M) if and only if (14) holds.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, a key determinant of whether bilingualism increases or reduces the amount of
home language content available on the Internet is the extent of substitution between
foreign and home content as measured by F .
5.2 Domestic welfare
In this subsection, we study how bilingualism a¤ects the welfare of the home country.32
Before proceeding to welfare comparison, we show a result that facilitates it.
In the Appendix, we show that we can normalize the model, without loss of generality,
by setting parameters a = b = m = 1 and scaling the amount of content by a factor 1=bm: In
31Comparing nT1 with n
M is appropriate as long as we assume that a CPs (platform-specic) xed cost
of entry is the same and does not depend on the identity of the platform. Even if xed cost of entry
is independently distributed across the platforms, the amount of content available to each consumer in
equilibrium is given by nT1 or n
M depending on whether consumers are bilingual or monolingual.
32A similar analysis would hold for world welfare. Under our small country assumption, bilingualism
allows foreign CPs to sell content to domestic consumers. Remark 1 in Section 4 shows that the foreign
platform has an incentive to provide access to foreign CPs. Therefore, bilingualism raises the joint prot
of the foreign platform and the foreign CPs. Hence, world welfare increases whenever domestic welfare
increases.
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the normalized model, we use the notation enF = nF=bm to denote the normalized quantity
of foreign content and dene CS(enF ; F ) as the consumer surplus (net of the stand-alone
value u) and d(enF ; F ) as the domestic producer surplus, which is the sum of the prot
of the domestic platform and and the prots of the domestic CPs. Then, as shown in the
Appendix, the domestic welfare in the original model can be written
W = u+ abm

CS(enF ; F ) + b
a
d(enF ; F ) : (15)
Therefore, comparing bilingual welfare with monolingual welfare is equivalent to comparing
CS(enF ; F ) + (b=a)d(enF ; F ) with CS(0; 0) + (b=a)d(0; 0) where b=a > 0 is the relative
weight of the producer surplus in the domestic welfare. In other words, in the welfare
comparison, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to the weighted sum of the
consumer surplus and the producer surplus in the normalized model.
From now on, we thus discuss the e¤ect of bilingualism on consumer surplus and pro-
ducer surplus in the normalized model. The consumer surplus is:




2 + (1  x1)2

;
while the domestic producer surplus is
d(n






In what follows the welfare e¤ect of bilingualism will result mostly from the combination
of the positive e¤ect of consumer concentration on the indirect network externality with
the negative allocative e¤ect of price ination.
Consider rst the case of market sharing with no content substitution F = 0. Then, the
intensity of competition is unchanged (B = M) so that bilingualism improves the o¤er of
platform 1 without a¤ecting the price (per consumer) that each platform levies on domestic
CPs. Platform 1s consumer market share and mass of CPs increase, while the reverse holds
for platform 2. Overall consumers collectively benet from platform 1s higher supply of
content. Similarly bilingualism raises CPssurplus because they benet from economies of
scale in the interactions with consumers. However, the aggregate e¤ect on the domestic
producer surplus is ambiguous since bilingualism reduces platform 2s prot. We nd that
there is a cuto¤ such that bilingualism increases the domestic producer surplus if and only
if nF is above the cuto¤.
Consider now the polar case in which F is large, close to 1=2, still with market sharing
(recall that is requires 1=2 < nF < 1=2+1=(2B) by Assumption A1 and (11))). In this case,
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domestic CP participation is lower on both platforms under bilingualism.33 Hence domestic
producer surplus is lower. Moreover, due to lower participation of CPs, the consumer surplus
generated by platform 2 is also lower. But given that nF (> 1=2) > nM , bilingualism
increases the consumer surplus generated by platform 1. The overall e¤ect on consumer
surplus then depends on the amount of foreign content.
Consider nally the case in which nF is so large (i.e., nF  nF ) that bilingualism leads
to the tipping equilibrium with the monopoly price. Then, we can show that bilingualism
increases consumer surplus since the increase in the total amount of content exceeds the
increase in total transportation cost. CPssurplus may increase or decrease depending on
F as the concentration of consumers in the foreign platform allows CPs to avoid duplication
of xed cost. A su¢ cient condition for bilingualism to reduce the producer surplus is that















4t  3 : (16)
This condition is always satised if t is close to one: when there is little di¤erentiation of
service o¤ered by the platforms, bilingualism always reduces producer surplus if it leads
to the tipping equilibrium. Hence, if (16) holds, there is a conict between the consumer
surplus and the producer surplus e¤ects and bilingualism reduces domestic welfare if b=a
is large enough.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 6 (domestic welfare): (i) When F = 0, in any shared equilibrium, bilingual-
ism increases consumer surplus and domestic CPssurplus. It increases domestic producer
surplus if nF is larger than a threshold.
(ii) When F is large, in any shared equilibrium, bilingualism reduces domestic producer
surplus while it increases consumer surplus if nF is large enough.
(iii) When bilingualism leads to the tipping equilibrium with the monopoly price, it
increases consumer surplus. It reduces domestic producer surplus if condition (16) holds.
Proof. See Appendix
Remark 2 (monopoly platform in the monolingual case): We can also perform welfare
comparison of the bilingual case with an alternative scenario of the monolingual case.
33This follows from nB1 = x
B
1 =4 < n
M in the normalized model.
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Namely, in the monolingual case, platform 1 does not enter the home country and hence
platform 2 remains as the monopoly platform while, in the bilingual case, both platforms
compete. Suppose that we do the comparison for a given location of platform 2. Then, in
the monolingual case, by substituting F = 0 into (12), we nd that the amount of home
language content available on the monopoly platform 2 is bm=2, which is larger than nM
in the duopoly monolingual case. This is because the indirect network externality e¤ect
dominates the e¤ect from monopoly price. This result together with the fact that the for-
eign platforms prot is not part of the domestic welfare implies that domestic welfare is
higher in the monopoly monolingual case than in the duopoly monolingual case. Therefore,
if bilingualism reduces welfare with respect to the duopoly case, it also reduces it with respect
to the monopoly case.34
Simulation for the general case: domestic welfare
To gain more insights on welfare e¤ects of bilingualism we solved the model numerically.
Figure 2 shows the results of the simulation for the normalized model, i.e., under the
assumption that a = b = m = 1. Given these parameter values, Assumption A2 implies
t > 1, which we satisfy by setting t = 1:1. The horizontal axis in Figure 2 represents
nF 2 [0; 1] and the vertical axis represents F 2 [0; 1=2), where the latter range corresponds
to the rst part of Assumption A1. To account for the parameter values consistent with
the second part of Assumption A1 (i.e., nF > 2F (1   F )) and the shared equilibrium
outcome, we consider only the points located between the curves nF = 2F (1   F ) and
xB1 = 1. In general, for a given t, there can be four regimes depending on the values of
nFand F :
 Regime I: CS(nF ; F )  CS(0; 0) and d(nF ; F )  d(0; 0)
 Regime II: CS(nF ; F )  CS(0; 0) and d(nF ; F ) < d(0; 0)
 Regime III: CS(nF ; F ) < CS(0; 0) and d(nF ; F )  d(0; 0)
 Regime IV: CS(nF ; F ) < CS(0; 0) and d(nF ; F ) < d(0; 0)
Figure 2 shows all possible regimes for t = 1:1 in the shared equilibrium. Then, for any
given nF and a relatively small F consistent with the shared equilibrium (i.e., xB1 < 1),
bilingualism increases both the consumer surplus and the producer surplus. As F increases,
34However, we also should take into account the e¤ect on the production of home language content,
which we analyze in the next section. Then, as the monopoly removes the positive feedback between
content production and platform competition, this e¤ect goes in favor of the duopoly. Therefore, the
welfare comparison becomes ambiguous between the monopoly case and the duopoly case.
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we enter into the region of the (nF ; F ) plane where bilingualism increases the consumer
surplus but decreases the producer surplus. A further increase of F brings us into the
region where bilingualism decreases both the consumer surplus and the producer surplus.
(Regime III does not exist for the parameters considered.)
In most western European countries and Latin American countries, we expect a high F
and a high nF and hence these countries are likely to be in Regime II where bilingualism
increases the consumer surplus while decreasing the producer surplus.35 By contrast, in
Asian countries such as China, Japan, Korea etc., we expect a low F and a low nF relative
to European countries. Then, as long as F is su¢ ciently smaller than nF , bilingualism
will increase the consumer surplus and the producer surplus.
6 Production of home language content
In the previous sections, we assumed that a certain amount of home language content had
already been produced by a number of CPs by the time when the platforms choose the
subscription fees they will charge to CPs. We here make this amount (i.e., the number of
CPs) endogenous. To this end, we expand the timeline of the model by introducing Stage
0 before Stages 1-3, which were discussed in Section 2:
 Stage 0: Each content producer decides whether to produce content or not.
We assume that at Stage 0, a CP does not know the realization of the xed cost of
making its content available to each platform but knows the xed cost of producing it. Let
G() be the distribution of the xed cost of production. Let off be the prot that each CP
expects to earn with his or her content through o¤-line transactions. off is assumed to be
a positive constant. Let on represent each CPs expected prot from online interactions
with consumers via the two platforms. If on is a constant as well, the amount of content
produced is equal to G(off+on). Below we study how bilingualism a¤ects the production
of home language content.
35If we take into account that countries for which translating/dubbing content is relatively costly (like
Scandinavian countries or the Netherlands) have a relatively high degree of bilingualism, consumer surplus
gain from bilingualism will be higher for these countries than for the rest of European countries when we
allow for translating foreign content in the monolingual benchmark.
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6.1 Monolingual case
Consider rst the monolingual case. Recall that for a mass m of home language content
produced, the multiplier in the monolingual case M (m), given by equation (4); increases
with m. (In what follows, we use notation making explicit the dependency of M on m:
M (m)). In other words, the intensity of platform competition increases with the amount of
home language content produced. Then, each CPs expected prot from online interactions




















which increases with m: Therefore, the equilibrium amount of home language content pro-
duced at stage 0, denoted by mM , is the xed point of the following mapping
m 7! G(off + on;M(m)):
There must be at least one xed point as G(off + on;M(m)) is strictly increasing with
m, bounded from above and has a strictly positive value when m = 0. We assume that
it is unique. The analysis shows that there is positive feedback between home language
content production and platform competition: the more content is produced, the more
intense is the platform competition, which lowers the fees charged by the platforms and
hence increases the amount of content produced.
6.2 Bilingual case
In the bilingual case, the multiplier B (m) is dened in equation (7): In the shared equi-




























b(1  F )xB1 (m)
1 + B(m)(1   )









Therefore, the equilibrium amount of domestic content produced at stage 0, denoted by
mB, is the xed point of the following mapping
m 7! G(off + on;B(m)):
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Such an equilibrium exists provided that nF is not too large to satisfy the inequality pre-
sented in (11):
In the case of the tipping equilibrium with the monopoly price, each CPs expected




















In this case, on;T does not depend on m. Therefore, the equilibrium amount of home
language content produced at stage 0 is G(off + on;T )  mT : In particular a tipping
equilibrium exists if nF is su¢ ciently large to satisfy the inequality given in (13).
6.3 Comparison
Consider rst the scenario with no content substitution: F = 0. In the case of the market
sharing equilibrium (i.e., when nF is small), the presence of foreign content does not a¤ect
the intensity of competition and as argued in section 5.2 domestic CPsprot is higher under
bilingualism. Therefore, as long as bilingualism leads to the market sharing equilibrium, it
raises the amount of home language content produced. By contrast, in the case of tipping
with the monopoly price (i.e., when nF is large but still with F = 0), the foreign platform
pricing is not constrained by the domestic platform so that the price increase may discourage
some production of content. In addition, the aforementioned positive feedback disappears
as the prot of a domestic CP in the tipping equilibrium is independent of m. Therefore,
we expect bilingualism to reduce home content production when mM is large, which occurs
if there is intense platform competition (t is small) or large values of interactions (ab is
large).
Consider now the scenario with some content substitution, F > 0: For a given market
share, increasing the degree of content substitution will decrease the production of home
language content for two reasons. First, the domestic CPs have less interactions with
consumers on the foreign platform. Second, they face higher prices of access to either of
the two platforms. We thus expect the home content production to decline when the degree
of substitution is high. We have:
Proposition 7 (content production):
(i) Suppose that F is small.
(a) When market sharing occurs in the bilingual case, bilingualism increases the
production of home language content.
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(b) When tipping with the monopoly price occurs in the bilingual case, bilingualism
reduces the home language content produced if the following condition holds








(ii) Suppose that F is large. Then bilingualism reduces the production of home language
content when it leads to market sharing or to market tipping with the monopoly price.
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 7 is similar to Proposition 5 in that bilingualism reduces (increases) the
domestic production of content when there is a high (low) degree of substitution between
foreign and domestic content. However, there is one major di¤erence. Namely Proposition
7(i)(b) shows that even if there is no content substitution, bilingualism can reduce the
production of domestic content if tipping occurs. This is quite in contrast with the result
we have seen previously in Section 5.2: for given amount of domestic content produced,
in the tipping equilibrium with F = 0, bilingualism increases the content available in
the Internet. The reason for such a contrast is the interplay between content production
and platform competition. As we already pointed out, the content production by new
CPs intensies competition between online intermediaries. The positive feedback e¤ect
that exists if the two platforms actively compete disappears when the market tips and the
foreign platform acts as an unconstrained monopoly.
6.4 Discussion
The conclusion that under certain conditions, bilingualism may result in the reduction of
the home language content available to the domestic consumers suggests that government
interventions to support domestic cultural goods based on the home language may be
warranted. With regards to cultural goods and services protection, there were several
recent policy initiatives in the EU, Canada and Brazil which were inspired by the idea that
an individuals decision to consume foreign cultural goods imposes a negative externality
on other domestic consumers. In our model, such negative externalities among consumers
occur as consumption of foreign content confers market power to the foreign platform,
which then extracts a higher surplus from domestic content providers and thereby reduces
production of home language content.
The ideas about market failures in the cultural goods production and trade have mo-
tivated several recent proposals by World Trade Organization (WTO) member states that
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certain cultural and creative goods and services should either be given a special treat-
ment within the international trade law or taken entirely outside of the WTO jurisdiction
and transferred under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Educational, Scientic and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The e¤orts of several country governments (most of
all those of France, Canada and Brazil) to move matters of trade in audiovisual products
outside of the jurisdiction of the WTO have culminated in 2007 in the Convention on the
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions under the auspices of
the UNESCO. One of the provisions included in this Convention is that signatory parties
have the right and the obligation to protect and promote their cultural expressions, even
if this objective may only be attained by the adoption of restrictive trade policies.
The European Unions Creative Europe Programme is an example of the recent EU
policy initiatives that were motivated by the idea that market failures in trade, production
or consumption of cultural goods could be rectied by government policy interventions.
The Programme has the budget of 1.46 billion for subsidizing the European cultural and
creative sectors in the period of 2014-2020.36
Our results suggest that home language CPs and the domestic platform are complemen-
tary as without meaningful platform competition, the former is subject to the exercise of
the monopoly power by the foreign platform.37 Therefore, promoting a domestic platform
that can compete against the foreign platform should be an imporant part of the policy
intervention. Somewhat paradoxically, this may require removing barriers that make it
di¢ cult for the domestic platform to distribute foreign content. Such a measure would
create a level-playing eld for the domestic platform in its competition against the foreign
platform as foreign CPs whose content is already accessible for consumers in the foreign
country do not need to incur any xed cost to make their content available on the foreign
platform for home country consumers.
Our results also provide novel rationales for subsidizing production of home language
content. First, content production in a two-sided market is suboptimal as content producers
36The general objectives of Creative Europe are: (a) to safeguard, develop and promote Euro-
pean cultural and linguistic diversity and to promote Europes cultural heritage; (b) to strengthen
the competitiveness of the European cultural and creative sectors, in particular of the audiovi-
sual sector, with a view to promoting smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. See http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:347:0221:0237:EN:PDF
37In 2014 the EU parliament voted a non-binding resolution urging the European Commission to consider
breaking up Google (i.e., unbundling search engines from other commercial activities) as a remedy for its
anticompetitive practices. In the context of these charges, some member of the European Parliament have
accused Google of using its market power to divert tra¢ c away from the European digital content providers
and imposing unfavorable terms of access to its search platform for European artists, publishers, recording
companies, and photographers (Gomez (2014)).
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do not take into account positive externalities that they generate to the other side of
the market, i.e., consumers. Second, the positive feedback e¤ect between home language
content production and platform competition provides an argument for subsidizing content
production in the home language. Third, bilingual countries have additional reasons to
subsidize content production as foreign content may crowd out home language content
directly (through substitution) and indirectly (by softening platform competition). More
generally, we contribute to the debate on protection of cultural goods by analyzing the
production and distribution of cultural goods in relation to online content distribution
platforms.38
7 Conclusion
In a small open economy producing home language content, bilingualism allows domestic
consumers to enjoy foreign language content but may result in crowding-out of home lan-
guage content when foreign content is a substitute to home language content. Analyzing
bilingualism from the perspective of the two-sided online intermediation market generates
the following novel insights. On the one hand, bilingualism has the benet of increasing
cross-side network externalities by raising concentration of consumers in the foreign plat-
form, which can increase the amount of home language content produced and/or distrib-
uted online. On the other hand, bilingualism can reduce home language content production
through two di¤erent channels. First, substitution between foreign content and home lan-
guage content reduces the two-sided market multiplier, which softens platform competition
and induces both the foreign and the domestic platforms to charge higher access fees to
domestic CPs. Second, when bilingualism leads to a tipping equilibrium, the domestic
platform is driven out of the market and the foreign platform can charge monopoly price
to domestic CPs. This completely removes the positive feedback between home language
content production and platform competition, which this paper has identied.
In our analysis, we neglected other potential benets of bilingualism. More specically,
bilingualism may induce more foreign platforms to enter the home country39 and may allow
domestic CPs to create and export content in the foreign language. Another important
38In a similar context, Ji et al. (2016) study online advertising industry in relation to search engine
platforms and nd that a country with its own domestic search engine has more online advertising intensity
(which is dened as online advertising spending over GDP) than a country without a domestic search engine.
39 However, in contrast to the traditional manufacturing sector, competition in the Internet often leads to
a winner-takes-all outcome. Therefore, if competition within the foreign country creates a single dominant
rm in that country, then it is pretty likely that a single foreign platform enters the home country.
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benet of bilingualism that we did not capture in our model is that it can increase the
number of consumers using the Internet early on when little content is available in the
home language.40
Although our paper is focused on a hypothetical small open economy, our results provide
insights into the prevalence of US-originated platforms outside of the US. The presence of a
relatively large fraction of bilingual consumers in the home country allows a US platform to
leverage its access to the US content so that a tipping equilibrium can prevail in the home
country. Our results show that bilingualism can reduce the production of content in the
home language when there is little di¤erentiation between competing platforms in terms of
the service they o¤er to consumers and a high degree of substitution between content in
English and content in the home language. Our analysis also highlights the importance of
cultural factors and characteristics of content as they a¤ect the volume of relevant English
content for a given country as well as the degree of substitution between content in the
home language and content in English.
Our paper is a rst step in the study of the economics of languages and platforms in the
Internet. There are many interesting issues for future research. One potential extension
is related to the presence of translation services (o¤ered by platforms such as Google).
The quality of such services has been increasing over time. Such an extension could be
used to analyze how the increase in the quality of the translation service a¤ects platform
competition and domestic content production. Yet another promising avenue of future
research is to extend the analysis beyond the small open economy and explicitly model
platform competition both in the bilingual home country and in the monolingual foreign
country.
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9.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is straightforward from the discussion in the main text. We here prove that
there is no tipping equilibrium. Suppose that all consumers subscribe to platform 1. If
platform 1 charges zero price, then platform 1 can attract a mass mb of CPs since a CPs
gross prot from subscribing to platform 1 is b. Hence, an upper bound on a consumers
expected gross surplus from joining platform 1 is u+abm. Under A2, the consumer located
at the opposite extreme point has an incentive to join platform 2 and obtain u rather than
to join platform 1 and obtain u+ abm  t since t > abm.
9.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The cases (i) and (ii) are shown already. Suppose nF < nF < nF . Then, the optimal
price for platform 1 is the highest price inducing market cornering for F2 = 0, denoted







. Given F2 = 0, reducing F1 below F 1 is not protable since
this deviation still allows platform 1 to corner the market and in this case having F1 closer
to F T1 increases its prot. Increasing the price above F

1 (n
F ) is not protable since this
deviation makes platform 1 share the market with platform 2, which is suboptimal.
9.3 Proof of Proposition 4
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< xB1 < 1:
The proof of (ii) follows from the above discussion.
9.5 Normalization of the model to a = b = m = 1
Consider the original model with (a; b;m) in Section 2. Since the case of monolingual
consumers is a particular case of bilingual consumers with nF = 0, we consider the case of











x1(1  F )b  F1

; n2 = m (x2b  F2) :
We can normalize the original model as follows:
exi = xi; eni = ni
bm
; enF = nF
bm




;ea = eb = em = 1:
Then we have exi = 1
2
+
(en1 + enF   2Fen1)  en2
2eten1 = ex1(1  F )  eF1; n2 = ex2   eF2:
In the original model, the domestic welfare is given by:
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Note that the rst part of A1 is the same both in the original model and in the nor-
malized model and the second part of A1 becomes enF > 2F  1  F  in the normalized
model. A2 becomes t > 1 in the normalized model.
9.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Consider consumer surplus. The case F = 0 follows from the discussion above. Under
market sharing and F = 1=2; we have
nF   txB1 = nB2   t(1  xB1 ):
Using this condition, we nd:


























which is convex in xB1 , increasing at x
B
1 = 1: The value at x
B











as t > 1: The value at nF = 1=2 is
t





















which is negative for small t > 1, as shown by the plot below:






CS gain for nF = 1=2 and F = 1=2:
Hence, for small t; CS increases with bilingualism only for nF large enough while for t
large it increases for all nF :
Let us turn to tipping at monopoly price. In the normalized model, we have

























where the rst inequality is from nF  nF .

































































Which is convex in xB1 and positive if x
B
1 is above some threshold (smaller than 1),
hence if nF is above a threshold.
When F = 1=2 we have
 
1  xB1
























which is negative for all xB1 2 [0:5; 1].
The tipping case follows from the discussion.
9.7 Proof of Proposition 7























Consider the case of tipping. Under our assumption that mM is uniquely dened, if
G(off + on;M(m0)) > m0 holds for some m0 then mM > m0. Therefore, a necessary and
su¢ cient condition for the bilingualism to reduce the amount of home language content is
on;M(mT ) > on;T which is equivalent to









Suppose now that F is large, close to 1=2. Then in the case of market sharing, we have
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Hence for all m we have on;B(m) < on;M(m); implying the domestic production is lower
under bilingualism.












Thus bilingualism reduces the production of domestic content.
9.8 Endogenous pricing of content providers
We here determine (a; b) in an endogenous way. Once (a; b) is determined, (ai; bi) can be
obtained from Table 1.
We assume that for each content, there is a probability  that a consumer wants to
consume it. Consuming a domestic content doesnt preclude consuming another domestic
content. Let v represent the value that a given consumer obtains from a unit of content
that he or she wants to consume. Let F () be its distribution, assumed to be the same for
all desired contents. We assume that the hazard rate of F () is increasing such that the
monopoly price pm is uniquely dened. Assume that the platform matches consumers with
desired contents but a given consumer discovers his/her valuation for a given content and its
price only after incurring a search cost c such that 0 < c < E [v   pmjv > pm] Pr [v > pm].
If there is mutual substitution with a foreign content, a bilingual consumer consumes
at most one unit of either one or another and v is perfectly correlated between the two
substitute content units. The bilingual consumer is then matched with any of the two CPs
with equal probability and learns v and this CPs price after incurring a costs c: She may
then buy it or incur c a second time to learn the other CPs price. We assume passive
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beliefsmeaning that if consumers search some content and nd a price they didnt expect,
they do not revise their expectation about the other CPs price. Note that if both CPs
charge the monopoly price, no consumer has an incentive to engage in the second search.
Then it is well known from Diamond (1971) that there is an equilibrium where all CPs
charge pm. Indeed if this is anticipated by consumers, no CP has an incentive to charge
p > pm since this reduces the prot from those consumers who found its content after the
rst search. Moreover no CP has an incentive to charge p < pm, because this cannot raise
sales given that no consumer engages in the second search.
Hence, we have:
a =  (E [v   pmjv > pm] Pr [v > pm]  c) and b = pm Pr [v > pm] :
9.9 Multihoming of consumers
In the paper, we assumed that consumers single-home. We can show that even if we allow
them to multi-home, they have no such incentive. Note that we assume that the xed
cost of making a given content available to platform 1 is perfectly correlated with that of
making it available in platform 2. Therefore, it is obvious that in the equilibrium of the
monolingual case, no consumer has an incentive to multihome. We below prove that no
consumer has an incentive to multihome in the bilingual case either.
Proposition 8 In any equilibrium, no consumer has an incentive to multihome regardless
of whether consumers are bilingual or monolingual.
Proof. Consider the equilibrium of the bilingual case. Consider rst nB1  nB2 . Then
no consumer using platform 1 wants to multihome as all content that he or she can nd
in platform 2 can be found in platform 1. It can be easily veried that no consumer using
platform 2 wants to multihome either. In the equilibrium, the location of the consumer





  tx = anB2   t(1  x):




  t < anB2   t(1  x).
As the marginal consumer has no incentive to multihome, no infra-marginal consumer has
such incentive either.
Consider now nB1 < n
B
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multihoming. Therefore, the consumer who is indi¤erent between the two platforms has
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which is equivalent to
a(1  2F )(nB2   nB1 ) < t(1  x):
From Proposition 3(i), we have
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where the last inequality comes from Assumption 2.
9.10 Figures
Figure 1. Evolution of percentages of English speaking Internet users and
web pages (Pimienta, Prado and Blanco, 2009)
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Figure 2. Contour of CS(nF ; F ) = CS(0; 0) and d(nF ; 
F ) = d(0; 0)
10 Online appendix (not for publication): extensions
In the online appendix, we provide three extensions which show the robustness of our re-
sults. The most interesting among them is the rst extension, which considers an alternative
platform business model where each platform pays for content and charges consumers for
the access to that content. The second extension considers the scenario in which the plat-
forms charge access fees to both sides. The last considers the case in which the platforms
can charge transaction fees.
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10.1 Buy and resell
In this subsection, we consider an alternative platform business model in which each plat-
form pays for content and charges consumers for the access to that content. There is no
payment from consumers to CPs (i.e., b = 0). As the setting with only monolingual con-




= (0; 0), we
focus on the setting with bilingual consumers. Let Pi denote the payment from platform i
to a domestic CP who makes its content available on the platform. We modify Assumption
A1 as follows:
Assumption A1: 1=2 > F ; nF > 2F (1  F )am:
The rst part of A1follows from the same assumption in A1. To explain the second
part, suppose that platform 1 has cornered the consumer market share and chooses P1 =
(1  F )a (i.e., it pays back to domestic CPs all the consumer surplus that they generate).
This generates an upper bound of the number of CPs on board at platform 1, which is
equal to (1  F )am. The second part of A1ensures that the condition nF > 2Fn1 holds
at this upper bound.
We consider the following game:
 Stage 1: Each platform i for i = 1; 2 simultaneously chooses the price to domestic
CPs for their content Pi and the access fee for consumers Ai
 Stage 2: After observing these prices, domestic CPs make decisions to subscribe to
platform 1 and/or platform 2.
 Stage 3: After observing (n1; n2), each consumer decides which platform to use.
At Stage 3, given the supply of content (n1; n2) and the prices (A1; A2), platform 1s






F   2Fn1   n2)  (A1   A2)
2t
(21)
At Stage 2, the measure of home language content available on platform i is given by
ni = mPi:
Platform is prot is
i = Aixi  m (Pi)2 :
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1  (1  2F )2
12t  a2m 1 + (1  2F )2 ; (23)
where we assume 12t > a2m

1 + (1  2F )2, which ensures the existence of the equi-
librium.41 Under Assumption A1, we nd xB1 > 1=2, which is similar to the result in
Proposition 4.42
In the monolingual case, it follows from (22) and (23) that there is a symmetric equi-
librium where each platform chooses prices




Let us compare the monolingual case with the bilingual case when the latter leads to
the shared equilibrium (including the limit of xB1 = 1). The amount of home language
content available on each platform is then





















2(1 F ) . We have n
M > nB2 from x
B
1 > 1=2. n
M > nB1 holds
if and only if the market does not become too concentrated in the bilingual case, i.e.,
xB1 <
1
2(1 2F ) . Therefore when 
F is small, bilingualism can increase the amount of domestic
content available at the foreign platform, while it reduces it when F is large, in particular
when F > 1=4 (in which case 1
2(1 2F ) > 1).







Consumer surplus in the bilingual case is
CSB = anFxB1  














41A market sharing equilibrium exists if nF satises the condition anF < 3t  a2m2 (1  2F )2:














Notice that the last term in CSB is larger than CSM . Hence we nd that CSB > CSM when
F is small. In this case, under bilingualism, access to foreign content combines with larger
supply of domestic content on the foreign platform to raise consumer surplus.
As F increases, the foreign platform reduces its supply of domestic content due to lower
protability. Combined with the price adjustment and the lower value at platform 2, this
may reduce consumer surplus. For the case where F is close to 1/2, domestic content is
substituted by foreign content and, using condition (23), we nd that the consumer surplus
is lower under bilingualism if




where the left hand side increases with xB1 2 (0:5; 1] from 6 to 7. This condition is compatible
with our condition 12 > a2m=t: Thus the consumer surplus decreases with bilingualism
when there is little platform di¤erentiation or when the value of content is large.
In summary, in the alternative business model where platforms generate revenue only
through consumer access fees to content, we nd that as foreign language content crowds
out home language content, bilingualism can reduce home language content available on
the Internet and can even reduce consumer surplus. Reduction in consumer surplus is more
likely when the platforms are less di¤erentiated and consumers enjoy greater benet from
content. These conclusions are consistent with the results we obtained in the baseline model
in which the consumer access fee is zero and the platforms generate revenue by charging
access fees to CPs.
10.2 When platforms charge access fees to both sides
We here provide the analysis for the case in which the platforms charge access fees to both
sides. In addition to charging Fi to the CP side, platform i charges an access fee Ai to
the consumer side. After describing the shared equilibrium for the bilingual case (as the
monolingual case is a particular case of the bilingual case) without any restriction on the
fees, we also consider the case when there is non-negativity constraint on Ai and derive
the condition under which no platform has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium
described in Section 3 and Section 4 by charging a strictly positive fee to consumers.
We consider the following game:
 Stage 1: Each platform i for i = 1; 2 simultaneously chooses the access fee for domestic
CPs Fi and the access fee for consumers Ai
 Stage 2: After observing (F1; F2; A1; A2), domestic CPs make decisions to subscribe
to platform 1 and/or platform 2.
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 Stage 3: After observing (n1; n2), each consumer decides which platform to use.







nF + n1   2Fn1   n2
  (A1   A2)
2t
:
At Stage 2, the measure of CPs in each platform is given by
bx1(1  F )  F1 = n1=m;
bx2   F2 = n2=m:


















Each platforms prot is
1 = F1n1 + A1x1 = F1m(bx1(1  F )  F1) + A1x1;
2 = F2n2 + A2x2 = F2m(bx2   F2) + A2x2:
From the FOCs, we can characterize the shared equilibrium as follows:
FB1 =


































b(1  F )  a(1  2F )2 + (b  a)2o :
In the monolingual case of  = nF = 0, we have:
xM = xMi =
1
2
; FB = FBi =
b  a
4







for i = 1; 2:
We can also nd the condition under which each platform nds Ai  0 optimal. This
means that if there is non-negativity constraint in consumer pricing, each platform nds
Ai = 0 optimal, providing a rationale for our baseline model.
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Consider an interior equilibrium of the bilingual case described in Proposition 3 and we
study whether platform i has an incentive to deviate by charging Ai > 0: The rst-order
derivative of platform 1s prot with respect to A1 at A1 = 0 is given by









2 + B(1   ) :















We can extend our baseline model by introducing transaction fees in addition to sub-
scription fees. Each platform i o¤ers a tari¤ (Fi; pi) on the CP side where Fi is a xed
subscription fee and pi is a transaction fee. It is well-known from Armstrong (2006) that
when platforms compete in two-part tari¤s, there is a continuum of equilibria. This result
still holds in our setting since a platforms best response depends only on the measure of
CPs subscribing to its service but each platform has two instruments to induce subscription
of a given measure of CPs. More precisely, given (Fj; pj), there is a continuum of (Fi; pi)
that allows platform i to attract a given measure of CPs ni and any such (Fi; pi) gener-
ates the same prot to platform i.43 However, di¤erent transaction fees (p1; p2) generate
di¤erent level of platform competition and hence di¤erent equilibrium prots. For any
(p1; p2) 2 [0; b]2, a reduction in pi for i = 1 or 2 increases the multiplier of our two-sided
market and hence intensies competition. Therefore, the case of zero transaction fee that
we previously analyzed is a polar case in which the platform competition is the strongest.
We below study the other polar case of p1 = p2 = b in which the platform competition is
43Lets consider the monolingual case and assume that the xed cost of the marginal CP for platform
i is c (i.e., cm = ni). (The similar logic applies to the bilingual case as well.) For the marginal CP,
the binding participation constraint means c + Fi = (b   pi)xi(ni). Therefore, the platforms prot is
[Fi + pixi(ni)]  ni = [bxi(cm)  c] cm. Hence, the platform can use any combination of (Fi; pi) satisfying
c+ Fi = (b  pi)xi(ni) and obtain the same prot.
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the weakest and show that all of the previous results, except for the competition-softening
e¤ect of Proposition 2, obtain in this case as well. However, we conjecture that all of the
previous results in the baseline model including the competition-softening e¤ect should be
obtained for any (p1; p2) 2 [0; b)2 and provide an argument for why p1 = p2 = b is unlikely
to be observed.
When platform i o¤ers a tari¤of (Fi; pi = b), the number of CPs subscribing to platform
i uniquely depends on Fi and does not depend either on the rival platforms tari¤or on each
platforms consumer market share. In this sense, (Fi; pi = b) corresponds to the insulating
tari¤ of White and Weyl (2013). (See White and Weyl (2013) for the analysis of platform
competition in which each platform o¤ers insulating tari¤s to both sides.) In what follows,
we assume for simplicity that the foreign platform charges zero fee for the transactions
between domestic consumers and foreign CPs.
Since the monolingual case can be obtained from the bilingual case by setting nF =
F = 0, we study only the bilingual case. In what follows, we use tildato represent the
case of two-part tari¤ competition with p1 = p2 = b. When p1 = p2 = b, the measure of
CPs subscribing to platform i is given by
ni =  mFi for i = 1; 2: (24)
Since each platform captures all CPssurplus from transactions, Fi becomes a subscription
subsidy and takes a negative sign. Inserting (24) into the condition for the location of the











Since CPssubscription decisions do not depend on consumer subscription decisions, the
latter has no impact on the former. Hence, in contrast to the corresponding formula without
transaction fee (8), there is no multiplier in (25) either in the monolingual case or in the
bilingual one. Hence, bilingualism has no e¤ect on the degree of platform competition.
Platform 2 maximizes (F2 + bx2)n2 and from the rst order condition we obtain






F1 + x1b(1  F )

n1 and from the rst order condition we obtain
  eF1 = ex1b(1  F )
2  abm
2t
(1   ) : (27)
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By inserting (26) and (27) into (25), we obtain the equilibrium market share of Platform 1




































 enF : (29)
Now we study the cornering (i.e., tipping) equilibrium in which platform 1 captures
all consumers and charges a monopoly price on the CP side. Then, platform 1 maximizes 
F1 + b(1  F )

n1 and from the rst order condition, we obtain
  eF T1 = b(1  F )2 : (30)
This implies that the measure of domestic CPs is equal to
enT1 = mb(1  F )2 ; (31)
which is the same as in the case of no transaction fee. This cornering equilibrium exists if
platform 2 cannot attract any consumer without making a loss on the CP side. This occurs
exactly when the following condition holds:
nF > enF  1
2a
[2t  amb(1   )] :
Therefore, we obtain a result similar to Proposition 3.44
From (28), bilingualism increases the foreign platforms consumer market share if and












44To obtain nF > enF , we can proceed as follows. Given platform 1s strategy, compute the highest
prot that platform 2 can achieve by choosing a consumer marker share of 1  x. Then, we should nd a
condition that makes this prot (weakly) negative for any x 2 [0; 1]. It turns out that it is su¢ cient that
platform 2s prot is negative at x = 1, which gives nF > enF . Note also that enF is di¤erent from nF since
platform 1s strategy is not the same in both cases.
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 enF1 : (33)
Under Assumption A1, we can show that the above inequality holds. Hence, bilingualism
increases the foreign platforms consumer market share as in Proposition 4.
As bilingualism reduces the market share of the domestic platform, it reduces home
language content available through the domestic platform. In an interior equilibrium,










Therefore, if F = 0, bilingualism increases the home language content available in platform
1. If F is close to 1/2, the R.H.S. of the above inequality is larger than one and hence
bilingualism reduces the home language content available in platform 1. In the case of the
tipping equilibrium with the monopoly price, we nd that bilingualism reduces the amount




This condition is similar to (14) and hence we obtain a result similar to Proposition 5(ii).
Finally, we perform welfare comparison. We rst note that the welfare normalization
result in Section 5.2 is still valid in the case of competition with two-part tari¤. Consider
rst F = 0. In the interior equilibrium, bilingualism improves the o¤er of platform 1 with-
out a¤ecting the intensity of platform competition. Hence, it increases consumer surplus
for the same reasons explained in Section 5.2. Similarly, it increases the surplus of domestic
CPs but decreases the surplus of the domestic platform. Hence, the analysis of the interior
equilibrium for F = 0 is qualitatively the same as the one in the case of no transaction fee
in Section 5.2.
Under market sharing and F = 1=2; we have from the proof of Proposition 6


























At xB1 = 1, CS(n
F ; F )   CS (0; 0) = t3=4   t=(4t   1) which is strictly positive as t > 1.
Hence for nF large enough, bilingualism increases consumer surplus.
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which is negative for any xB1 2 (1=2; 1]. As the bilingualism reduces the prot of the
domestic platform, it reduces the producer surplus.
In the case of the tipping equilibrium with monopoly price, we get a result similar to
Proposition 6(iii): it can be easily veried that bilingualism always increases consumer







Therefore, we nd that most of the results we obtained in the baseline model without
transaction fee remain valid in the case of two-part tari¤ competition with the maximal
transaction fee p1 = p2 = b. The only important result which does not hold when p1 = p2 =
b is the competition-softening e¤ect of bilingualism. However, this e¤ect will exist for any
p1 = p2 2 [0; b). In addition, we think that the outcome with p1 = p2 = b is very unlikely
to arise.45 When p1 = p2 = b, the unique source of revenue for a CP is the entry subsidy
from the platforms. For instance, suppose now that there are some CPs whose content is
totally uninteresting to consumers who, as a result, do not spend time with this content.
If, in addition, these CPs have low entry costs, then the high entry subsidy combined with
p1 = p2 = b will attract such CPs with totally uninteresting content who will not pay b
since no transaction occurs.
45For instance, in the case of Amazon, the transaction fee consists of referral fee and closing fee. The
upper bound of the referral fee is 15% of the price of the item sold and the closing fee is typically $1.35.
See http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?ie=UTF8&nodeId=1161240.
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